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Enforcing the monopoly of violence is the first and maybe most important step in 
constructing a state.1 To achieve that goal, states must establish formal organizations 
that act as agents of the state and are endowed with its repressive powers.2 Although 
numerous studies have investigated the effects of high or low repressive capacities of 
states3 we still know very little about how organizations with sufficient repressive 
capacity are constructed in the first place, how their authority is established and solidi-
fied across the territory of a state, and how they are organized internally. The question 
is particularly relevant for the study of colonial governments that employed large-
scale violence to squash local resistance to state rule—in particular, settler colonies 
with white minorities obsessed with controlling indigenous populations.4 In these 
cases colonial governments had to create bureaucratic institutions that could effec-
tively deploy repressive state power against indigenous populations (e.g., to ensure the 
forced supply of labor), while simultaneously managing regular affairs of colonial life 
(e.g., adjudicate property disputes, etc.). In this article, we investigate the socioeco-
nomic conditions and administrative dynamics that determine how a colonial govern-
ment allocates material and human resources to meet this state-building challenge.
We differentiate between two challenges to the construction of a security apparatus. 
The first is the macro-strategic goal to project state power across territory and people, 
which is initially expressed via the investment into physical infrastructures, namely, 
the construction of police stations, and the accompanying assignment of personnel 
strength. The second and related challenge deals with the management of individual 
civil servants. We expect the macro-level allocation of material resources and person-
nel numbers to reflect strategic state priorities, such as the protection of economic 
extraction sites and of critical infrastructures, or the pacification of restive regions. We 
also expect the allocation of human resources to deviate from these strategic state 
priorities because of administrative challenges related to internal personnel manage-
ment. Scarcity of human capital, the resulting high bargaining power of skilled police 
officers, and their personal preferences for nonhardship positions forced the state to 
assign low-quality and inexperienced recruits to the most strategically important loca-
tions in the colony, likely undermining the macro-strategic goals that were driving the 
expansion of the colonial police.
To study these processes, we analyze the security forces of the former colony of 
German Southwest Africa, present-day Namibia. The colonial police force was estab-
lished in 1907 in the wake of the Herero and Nama uprising, which was put down in a 
ruthless counterinsurgency campaign that came to be known as the first genocide of 
the twentieth century.5 The establishment of the police was meant to solidify and con-
solidate the German colonial government’s control over territory and indigenous eth-
nic groups in the aftermath of active resistance. As such, it offers an ideal opportunity 
to study the dynamics that shape the constitution of a colonial security apparatus, fol-
lowing intense state violence in the presence of a white settler community.
Our empirical analysis relies on multiple original historical data sources. We draw 
on detailed colonial maps and annual reports to understand the spatial expansion of the 
police station network.6 In addition, a comprehensive dataset of hundreds of personnel 
files, compiled from the German Federal Archives, allows us to trace the internal chal-
lenges of human resource management within the police. The data represent a near full 
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census of all German rank and file police officers including, for example, information 
on sociodemographic profiles, professional backgrounds, experience in the military, 
and professional assessments by superiors. We complement these data with qualitative 
information from archives in Germany.7 Our analysis finds consistent evidence that 
the state’s desire for territorial control determined the investment of scarce resources 
across the colony but also generated real challenges in the management of police offi-
cers assigned across the station network.
We make two important contributions to the literature: first, our theoretical argu-
ment and empirical results add to general research on early phases of state building. 
Previous studies have highlighted the role of structural factors in explaining patterns 
of state presence and penetration.8 While we can lend some support to these argu-
ments, we also show that principal-agent problems in personnel management can 
undermine and contradict macro objectives in state-building and produce unintended 
consequences that limit the effectiveness of state institutions. Second, we contribute to 
the growing literature on settler colonialism.9 Historians and anthropologists have 
identified the divergence of interest between European colonists and colonial home 
governments as a prime characteristic of settler colonialism. Moreover, settler colo-
nies often featured a strong internal commitment to domination over the indigenous 
population, expressed in campaigns of intense violence—what has been called a “logic 
of elimination.”10 Our study details how a settler colony translated this logic into a 
repressive bureaucracy intended for subjugation and control of the indigenous popula-
tion in the aftermath of such a violent campaign.
Constructing the State
Enforcing the monopoly of violence is the key concern of any state administration, 
particularly in early phases of state building. Processes of state expansion and consoli-
dation almost necessarily lead to conflict between the central state and competing 
social organizations that aim at defending their authority against the state.11 
Consequently, effective institutions that yield the tools of physical violence are a key 
ingredient for the state-building project. This entails physical infrastructure, such as 
police stations, military bases, prisons, and the numbers and quality of manpower.
However, in many cases states are unable to project their repressive capacities 
equally across all areas falling within their borders. Scarcity forces state administra-
tions to focus repressive resources and to tolerate “blank spots” in state presence, 
generating opportunities for opposition against state authority.12 So how do states allo-
cate their scarce repressive resources across their territories to minimize these risks—
in particular after they have experienced substantial instances of violent resistance 
against state rule?
Resource Allocation under Conditions of Extreme Scarcity
Our theoretical argument begins with the recognition of pervasive scarcity constraints in 
state-building projects. Early state-building efforts are often hampered by a lack of 
financial resources, human capital, and oversight capacities. These types of scarcity 
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concerns are particularly pressing when states abruptly try to govern large swathes of 
territory not previously under their control—for example, in situations of territorial 
annexation and occupation, after military interventions, or during early colonialization.
Under colonial rule, most administrations had to build their security apparatuses 
with very limited financial and human resources. Metropolitan states tried to keep 
funding for colonies as limited as possible and generally expected colonial administra-
tions to meet their own financial needs.13 The colonial repressive apparatus rested on 
a small force thinly spread across vast territories.14 In most colonies, one armed mem-
ber of the security forces per 1,000 inhabitants was already considered a high num-
ber15 forcing colonial security forces to operate “beyond the space that could be 
administered.”16
Colonies also faced the tremendous problem of attracting qualified men to distant 
and unhealthy regions that had come to be known as the “white man’s grave.”17 As 
Louis Faidherbe, governor of Senegal at the end of the nineteenth century, put it 
bluntly, “the profession is tough, and hardly attractive.”18 As a consequence, many 
individuals entering the colonial civil and military service had questionable pasts and 
were poorly skilled and inexperienced. In 1837 Sir George Cornwall complained “that 
the scum of England was being poured into the colonies.”19 For example, French-
administered Chad, consisting mainly of deserts and swampy, inhospitable areas, 
repeatedly attracted dubious characters and junior staff: deployment into the colony 
was regarded as a sign of demotion.20
Finally, colonial states faced tremendous challenges to effective oversight and con-
trol. State agents were scattered across wide territories with very limited infrastruc-
tural penetration. Lack of modern means of communication prevented regular and 
timely exchange over long distances. Heliographs and telegraphs were limited to pri-
mary administrative and economic hubs, while communication to other areas had to 
rely on letters and messengers that could take weeks to transmit messages. Because of 
the limited availability of resources, actual oversight and control by high-level admin-
istrators took place only on rare occasions—mostly as reaction to transgressions rather 
than as effective means of prevention. Consequently, personnel allocated to remote 
areas were vested with tremendous discretion in performing its assigned tasks.21
We argue that these constraints severely affected the state’s allocation of repressive 
resources at the macro and micro levels in two interconnected ways. First, the colonial 
state often prioritized the macro-strategic goal of state survival, which required the 
concentration of infrastructural resources in important but also remote locations. 
Second, the lack of qualified personnel generates administrative challenges in the 
assignment of state agents to remote locations. The next two subsections elaborate on 
this argument in greater detail.
Strategic Priorities: Protection and Pacification
The scarcity of resources forces states to prioritize essential goals in the state-building 
project. States must align the allocation of repressive resources to their most important 
priorities: securing economic assets, guarding critical infrastructures, and preventing 
open rebellion.
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Research on the emergence of the modern state in Western Europe has emphasized 
opportunities for extraction as a key driver of state building.22 The state’s survival 
depends on its ability to extract resources from its land and its population. This is par-
ticularly true after existential threats to state survival have been minimized and the 
state can focus its attention on consolidating power and extracting tax resources from 
the population.23 Given the high priority of economic extraction, we should expect 
repressive resources to be allocated to areas that provide or promise high levels of 
economic rents to the nascent state: population centers with high levels of economic 
activity, particularly fertile land, and areas abundant with mineral resources. Such 
areas are associated not only with high value to the state but also with high risk of 
violent opposition against the state. Extractive activities strongly influence interac-
tions between the state and the population. They constitute a fundamental intervention 
into social life.24 Revolts against state extraction were frequent in the early phases of 
European25 and colonial state building.26 The high potential for local resistance against 
extraction motivates investments into repressive state capacity, while increased state 
capacity supports effective extraction and may thereby lead to renewed violent resis-
tance.27 This extraction-coercion cycle should lead to a high concentration of state 
security resources in resource abundant regions of the state:
Hypothesis 1: Extractive potential leads to stronger state presence.
Functioning states require not only financial resources: their ability to exercise control 
and regulate social relations depends on their physical penetration of territory. 
Transportation and communication infrastructures are essential in this respect. Roads, 
railways, and postal services play a key role as “agencies of change.”28 They help to 
bridge distances, connecting far-away places to political and administrative centers of 
power and thereby supporting the process of state building. In nineteenth-century 
Europe, roads acted as “administrative highways,”29 facilitating the movement of 
troops, tax collectors, and other state agents. In colonial states, infrastructures such as 
post offices or telegraph lines were essential for the central administration to project 
power, control local personnel, and to acquire timely information on peripheral 
regions.30 Such infrastructures also made the state more visible and tangible in periph-
eral areas, thereby increasing the risk of violent resistance against state penetration. 
Consequently, we expect states to invest security resources into the effective protec-
tion of these critical infrastructures:
Hypothesis 2: Transport infrastructure leads to stronger state presence.
The weaker a state, the more its stability depends on the capacity to constantly demon-
strate its resolve and to swiftly quell resistance in any form. Acts of opposition can 
showcase the state’s actual weakness and motivate further rebellion, threatening the 
state-building project.31 Such feelings of insecurity were pronounced in settler colo-
nies. White settlers’ keen awareness of the precariousness of their status often pro-
pelled them to extreme solutions to assure their long-term dominance, even if those 
solutions put them in conflict with their metropolitan governments.32
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Reliable assessments of risks of violent opposition are difficult though and often 
precluded by a lack of information about the sociopolitical conditions in peripheral 
regions. Thus, although states can hardly allocate repressive resources according to 
unforeseeable future rebellion, they can aim to prevent the reemergence of previous 
instances of violent opposition.33 Prioritizing areas that have experienced rebellion 
before is strategically sensible from at least two perspectives: first, previous instances 
of violent opposition attest to the willingness and ability of the local population to stage 
effective resistance against the state. Moreover, local grievances and combat experi-
ence both increase as a consequence of the previous violent encounters with the state. 
Second, from a purely symbolical viewpoint the state cannot accept renewed challenges 
to its authority. Thus, for example, Killingray highlights that in the Sudan and the Gold 
Coast “military headquarters stood in strategic centers at the heart of newly conquered 
territories, the forts and barracks intended to overawe recently rebellious Mahdists and 
Asantes.”34 Similarly, we expect that states invest their repressive resources into regions 
that have experienced uprisings by the local population in the past:
Hypothesis 3: Prior violent resistance leads to stronger state presence.
The Lack of Personnel
Macro-strategic concerns shape the allocation of state resources across the territory of 
the colony; creating an effective police apparatus, however, also requires qualified 
staff, especially given the role the police are meant to play for colonial governance. On 
the one hand the colonial police force is meant to be an effective instrument of vio-
lence and control. Police officers’ role typically included the suppression of political 
opposition by the indigenous population and the enforcement of labor recruitment. On 
the other hand, the police are also an explicitly civilian bureaucracy, meant to normal-
ize the enforcement of the state’s monopoly of violence and to facilitate economic and 
social exchange in colonial life. They must, for example, adjudicate property disputes 
between settlers, deal with petty crime, and act as go-betweens for the colonial gov-
ernment and the colonized.
Thus is it important that political leaders can trust the police not only to use force 
effectively, to minimize possible challenges to the authority of the state and facilitate 
the extraction of economic resources, but also to show restraint, so as not to unduly 
antagonize the local population. A large body of literature on government repression 
has highlighted the potential dangers in aggravating civilians for generating mass 
opposition and violence against incumbent regimes.35 This risk was particularly pro-
nounced in the context of colonial state building, where administrators had the task of 
upholding stability with very limited resources. Colonial states had to keep a fragile 
balance by signaling resolve and capacity to punish any recalcitrant behavior and at 
the same time preventing any unnecessary “excess” repression that might foment 
grievances and rebellion.
Recruiting and managing personnel in this context is challenging because of well-
known principal-agent problems.36 Since the state cannot perfectly observe applicants’ 
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quality during recruitment, or sufficiently monitor its agents’ effort in the fulfillment 
of their assigned tasks, adverse selection in the recruitment of personnel and moral 
hazard during the implementation of tasks is likely to arise.37 Modern bureaucracies 
have developed a number of mechanisms to limit these problems,38 but we believe that 
colonial governments struggled in this regard. Finding highly skilled, disciplined, and 
loyal recruits who could be sent to challenging and remote locations was a formidable 
challenge for colonial governments.
The macro-strategic imperative of early state building itself might have generated 
three interrelated dynamics that exacerbate personnel management problems. The 
objective of penetrating peripheral regions of the state’s territory: (1) increases the 
demand for high-quality staff and thereby increases the bargaining power of individual 
recruits; (2) creates a need for effective monitoring capacity in the administrative cen-
ters, which absorbs qualified recruits needed in the peripheral priority; and (3) creates 
opportunities for rent seeking.
A high demand for and scarcity of high-quality personnel increases the value of 
each professional and increases his or her leverage over his or her own assignment. 
Most recruits have little desire to be assigned to remote hardship posts. High-quality 
recruits can use their bargaining power to avoid such assignments. Eventually, the 
state administration faces the hard choices of either accepting the preferences for non-
hardship/low-priority stations or losing valuable resources altogether. This general 
dilemma is well known from personnel allocation in modern administrations: the most 
valuable human resources—the best-qualified teachers or health professionals, for 
example—tend to be allocated to posts that promise the best working conditions rather 
than to those with the highest need.39 This situation is likely to extend to repressive 
agents of the state. As a consequence, actual allocation patterns deviate from objective 
requirements and political prioritization: high-quality recruits tend to be assigned to 
nonhardship positions rather than to high-priority areas.
This dynamic is exacerbated by an increasing need for monitoring capacity within 
the security organization itself. In general, supervisors have little ability to control the 
actions of local agents. This restraint proved to be grave in German Southwest Africa. 
Police leadership might receive only monthly written reports from outlying stations and 
could send inspectors only once a year to influence local police behavior directly. These 
constraints increase the need for highly qualified personnel in the administrative center 
who can maximize effective supervision under adverse conditions. The need may then 
counteract the primary objective of securing the economic and political goals of the 
state via deploying high-quality personnel to peripheral regions.
Finally, recruits who lack high levels of intrinsic motivation, discipline, and rele-
vant skills may also have a desire for personal rent seeking and may therefore actively 
pursue assignments to strategically important but remote locations. Since the state’s 
macro strategy focuses on extractive activity and the use of violence against the indig-
enous population, individuals with an interest in rent seeking will target such locations 
to maximize their opportunities for extraction under minimal supervision. This creates 
a real challenge to the recruitment and assignment of police officers. “Bad types” have 
an incentive to misrepresent their motivations, further reinforcing processes by which 
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low-quality recruits are misallocated to politically and economically important periph-
eral regions, while high-quality personnel are assigned to less challenging areas in the 
administrative centers of the state:
Hypothesis 4: High-quality recruits are more likely to receive nonhardship 
assignments.
The Police in German Southwest Africa
To test our argument, we analyze the case of German Southwest Africa—one of 
Germany’s few colonial possessions and its only settler colony. While this case proves 
specific in the extent of colonial violence and metropolitan commitment to settler 
control,40 it also reflects the above-mentioned primary scope conditions of our argu-
ment, making it a meaningful empirical case for exploring the challenges of repressive 
resource allocation under conditions of extreme scarcity.
The police force of German Southwest Africa, the so-called Landespolizei, was 
formally established in 1905. Until then, members of the regular colonial army, the 
Schutztruppe, had fulfilled police functions. More than twenty years after the formal 
beginning of colonial rule, the force’s establishment reflected German Southwest 
Africa’s growing importance as a settler colony and the inadequacy of policing by the 
military. Prompted by growing settler numbers and the desire to disentangle the colony 
from military administration, the government in Windhuk and the Colonial Department 
(Kolonialabteilung) in Berlin began deliberations in 1900 over the establishment of a 
civilian police force. After tedious negotiations, they presented their first draft pro-
posal to local magistrates and district chiefs in 1903.41
The outbreak of the Herero and Nama war one year later, however, obstructed the 
realization of these plans. On January 12, 1904, Herero men raided white farms, rail-
roads, and towns, catching the Schutztruppe by surprise. Ten months later, the Nama 
also rose up against German rule. Increasing economic marginalization and repression 
by white settlers had pushed both into rebellion.42 It took the Germans three years, a 
massive surge of the Schutztruppe, and a ruthless, genocidal counter-insurgency cam-
paign, which left at least one third of the Herero and Nama dead, to quell the upris-
ing.43 Although acting governor Tecklenburg formally established the Landespolizei 
in early 1905, the administration failed to introduce a regular police force during the 
war. The force’s first budget provided only for a total of eighty police officers.44 
Moreover, failure of the 1905 ordinance to describe precise employment conditions 
led to a lack of volunteers. Only after Emperor Wilhelm II signed the decree setting 
forth the rights and duties of the Landespolizei in October 1907 did proper recruitment 
begin.
Even as the war prevented the establishment of the Landespolizei, it also under-
lined its necessity to German authorities. The white settler community was in constant 
fear of a renewed uprising.45 At the same time, the virtual annihilation of the Herero 
and Nama opened up scarce farmland, which attracted scores of new settlers, many of 
them former Schutztruppe soldiers. Spurred by expanding livestock production and 
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the discovery of diamonds in 1908, the colony underwent rapid economic develop-
ment.46 In 1907, a parliamentary budget memorandum accordingly emphasized that, 
aside from actual police work, the force had to protect resource extraction and critical 
infrastructure, and had to prevent renewed violent resistance. The memorandum 
stated: “The purpose of the Landespolizei consists in protecting borders and farms, in 
maintaining order in larger settlements, along the railways and in mining districts . . . 
as well as in checking pilferage.”47 This language suggests that, at least on paper, the 
creation of the colonial police forces followed well-defined macro-strategic directives 
that were in alignment with Hypotheses 1–3.
To fulfill this mandate, appropriate internal personnel management practices had to 
be established. The colonial authorities modeled the Landespolizei after metropolitan 
police forces, but they also emphasized its special, colonial, character. In contrast to most 
other colonial police, the Landespolizei consisted primarily of white officers. That 
African policemen might control white settlers was anathema to Germans, who consid-
ered it irreconcilable with their claim to civilizational superiority.48 The 1905 ordinance 
therefore created two divisions of the rank and file. On the one hand stood white ser-
geants (Polizeisergeant) and superior staff sergeants (Wachtmeister), later supplemented 
by constables (Polizist) and senior staff sergeants (Diensttuender Wachtmeister).49 On 
the other hand stood a corps of African police assistants (Polizeidiener), whose task 
consisted in “supporting” their white colleagues.50 In practice, African officers proved 
indispensable, especially as translators in daily dealings with the African population.51
The German policemen mirrored the regional and religious makeup of the metro-
pole. Most were protestants, had grown up in Prussia, and hailed from petty bourgeois 
backgrounds. Before entering the military, many had practiced a skilled trade. The 
majority had also fought together in the Herero and Nama war. What arguably attracted 
these young men most to the Landespolizei was the chance to earn a premium of 1000 
marks (Dienstprämie) and guaranteed employment in the civil service 
(Zivilversorgungsschein) after twelve years of combined military and police service.52 
For decommissioned Schutztruppe soldiers in particular, entering the police was a 
stepping stone to acquiring the capital they needed to buy their own farms in the col-
ony. Magistrates and inspection officers at times explicitly sought to attract qualified 
officers whom they knew from prior service in the Schutztruppe. For example, in 
1909, Magistrate von Frankenberg requested the transfer of sergeants Weernicke and 
Borchert because both had served in the Sixth Feldkompanie and were therefore famil-
iar with the Outjo area.53 Frankenberg had commanded part of the same unit during the 
1904–7 war and may have served with both of them.54 Pay depended on rank and 
seniority and ranged from roughly 3000 to 4000 marks.55 Although police thus earned 
approximately three times as much as their peers in the metropole, their wages 
amounted to little given the high and inflated prices in the colony. Especially during 
the first years of the police’s existence, most officers lived in poor conditions.56
The 1905 ordinance defined the force as a civilian institution with a military orga-
nization. At the center of the latter stood the chief of police, who was a senior military 
officer. He led police headquarters (Inspektion) and commanded all lower-ranking 
officers. Five so-called inspection officers (Inspektionsoffiziere) assisted the chief in 
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this task, heading one of the five eventual police districts and their subsidiary police 
stations. Inspection officers oversaw the maintenance of military discipline through 
regular inspections of police stations. Four (eventually two) police depots organized 
recruits’ basic three to four month military training, which focused on riding, shooting, 
and patrolling, as well as the legal basis of police work. At the center of the force’s 
civilian organization stood the magistrates (Bezirksamtmänner) and district chiefs 
(Distriktchefs). These civilian administrators commanded the district rank and file, 
instructed them in daily police work, and assigned them to individual police 
stations.57
Assignments of police officers to particular stations followed a strict chain of com-
mand, which meant that superior officers and civilian administrators determined the 
deployment of officers. Work on isolated stations was often dull and dangerous, and 
living conditions hard and unhealthy, which made such assignments generally unpopu-
lar across the rank and file. At the same time, service on a remote station could lead to 
professional advancement. Officers who exhibited leadership skills, military prowess, 
and the ability to work on their own for extended periods of time (e.g., by building or 
extending station buildings) were considered ideal for the position of Stationsältester 
and Wachtmeister. Thus, service at remote outposts was both a formal requirement—in 
the sense that someone had to do it to fulfill the tenuous mandate of protecting German 
settlers—but also an informal one in the sense that the demanding patrol service and 
harsh environment hardened recruits and prepared them for future responsibilities. Yet 
individual officers had little opportunity to formally articulate personal preferences in 
station assignments. For instance, personal documents such as application cover letters 
were far too formalized to allow prospective policemen the expression of personal pref-
erences. More importantly, superior officers would have considered any such expres-
sion a flagrant breach of discipline, deserving punishment.58 Analyzing assignment 
patterns in the colonial police therefore constitutes a hard test for our theory of informal 
bargaining power: official administrative procedures concentrated power at the highest 
levels of the police, enabling superior officers, in principle, to support their macro-
strategic goals with the deployment of high-quality recruits.
Several factors complicated the Landespolizei’s official purpose of protecting 
resource extraction, critical infrastructure, and preventing violent resistance. First, the 
police’s dual organizational structure produced frequent conflict and remained subject 
to debate. Inspection officers, magistrates, and district chiefs constantly quarreled over 
the correct chain of command and jealously defended their responsibilities.59 Second, 
the force struggled with a lack of sufficient personnel. The Reichstag budget of 1907 
provided for a total of 720 sergeants and staff sergeants as well as 370 African police 
assistants.60 Because of repeated budget cuts, the strength of the Landespolizei never 
attained that target. In 1912, the force reached its all-time high of about 570 white and 
320 African officers.61 This modest strength was thinly spread across the vast territory. 
In theory, stations with fewer than three officers should not have existed.62 But in 
1909, out of a total of sixty-nine stations, thirty-three were staffed with two officers, 
and nineteen with just one. Many of these one- and two-man stations lay in remote, 
rural areas, more than 100 kilometers away from the next station.63 Third, the 
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Landespolizei’s narrowly defined purpose conflicted with an actual plethora of duties. 
Although German police underwent a process of professionalization around the cen-
tury, policing remained indebted to an older German notion of policey that defined the 
purpose of policing as ensuring both the welfare of a population and its the security.64 
Coupled with the shortage of police and administrative personnel, this notion meant 
that members of the Landespolizei had to assume duties that had little or nothing to do 
with police work in a narrow sense. Policemen handled anything from health and vet-
erinary inspections, the enforcement of mining and labor legislation, to post and cus-
toms duties.65 One leading former officer took pride in the fact that police had acted as 
“girl Fridays,” that is, as all-purpose, itinerant agents of the colonial state.66
On the question of adverse selection, it is important to bear in mind that violence 
was ubiquitous in the work of all Landespolizei officers. Whether they worked in 
Windhuk or in remote Schuckmannsburg in an office or on patrol duty, policemen had 
to constantly uphold and defend not only their personal honor but also the colonial 
order itself in their daily interactions with the African population.67 Few officers hesi-
tated to employ violence to this end. Accordingly, there was no purposeful strategy of 
assigning potentially more violent and insubordinate recruits to remote stations. 
Rather, the lack of oversight during such assignments created more fertile conditions 
for disciplinary infractions and wanton mistreatment of the local population.
Research Design, Data, and Results
The qualitative description in the previous section offers some evidence of the factors 
that drove the spatial expansion of the colonial police forces and points to the impor-
tance of recruitment problems in police management. In this section we formally con-
front our theoretical hypotheses with additional evidence in two complementary 
empirical analyses. To identify the macro drivers of German colonial state building, 
we trace the spatial expansion of police stations and the allocation of personnel 
strength across the colony from 1907 to 1914. Specifically, we test whether economic, 
infrastructural, and political considerations are meaningful predictors of police station 
presence and personnel strength across the territory of the colony. In a second step, we 
proceed to unpack the challenges of allocating personnel across police stations. We 
draw on a near complete record of all police officer files from German archives to 
construct a dataset that tracks all station assignments from 1907 to 1914. We test which 
individual-level characteristics determine assignments, documenting essential trade-
offs and tensions between the macro-level strategy of the colonial government and the 
principal-agent relationship that complicates the management of personnel under dif-
ficult conditions.
The Distribution of Police Stations
Our first analysis aims to trace the macro-level expansion of repressive state capacity 
in the colony. We begin by taking the territory of the colony and dividing it into a ran-
dom set of equally sized grid cell units. We construct grid cells of fifty by fifty 
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kilometers, which produces 398 cells as our units of analysis. We opt for randomly 
drawn grid cells, because we want to test the determinants of police expansions with-
out relying on endogenous, preexisting administrative unit boundaries. For each grid 
cell we determine whether a police station existed in 1907, at the inception of the 
police force, and in 1912 near the end of Germany’s colonial rule. Information on 
existing police stations comes from Rafalski’s 1930 history of German Southwest 
Africa’s police force.68 Police stations come in three forms: regional stations 
(Bezirksämter), district stations (Distriktsämter), and local stations (Wachtposten). 
Regional stations are the largest and most important central offices for the police force 
and are responsible for all police activity within their designated area. District stations 
are administratively one level below regional stations, but also oversee their own area. 
Local stations represent the most common type of police presence and are created 
within the assigned territory of regional or district stations. They are small outposts for 
limited groups of police officers that served as base camps for patrols in the area. We 
also include the police depots that were in charge of training new recruits. We georef-
erence the location of all police stations in 1907 and 1912 via location names and a full 
registry of town names in colonial Namibia. We create simple dummy and count vari-
ables for the presence of police stations in 1907 and 1912 for our analysis. We also 
create a count measure that sums the total number of personnel assigned to each sta-
tion in a grid cell to measure the overall manpower committed to a particular region. 
Figure 1 displays the geographic distribution of police stations in 1907 and 1912.
Our main independent variables capture the economic, infrastructural, and political 
importance of each grid cell. A dominant theme motivating the expansion of the 
German colonial state was the extraction of valuable resources, which pertain primar-
ily to minerals and, after 1908, diamonds. Using official colonial maps we identify the 
number of mineral mines for each grid cell in 1907. The discovery of substantial dia-
mond deposits along the desert coast of Western Namibia in 1908 created an intense 
rush for extraction that required a parallel expansion of state capacity. We create an 
additional dummy variable that signifies the presence of diamond deposits after 1908. 
It is important that this time-varying indicator of economic extraction potential is 
fairly well identified. Since the location and discovery of diamond deposits was deter-
mined largely by exogenous forces, it allows us to identify the effects of resource 
discovery on the expansion of the police in a difference-in-difference setting. Apart 
from mineral extraction, the other important activity in the colony was agriculture. We 
use a detailed map of plots owned by white settlers, assigned for agricultural use to a 
measure of economic activity in each grid cell and calculate the percentage of land 
occupied by farmers in 1907 and 1911. Using a settler registry from 1907 we also 
localize all major towns of white settlers in each grid cell and sum the total size of the 
white population. Total white population represents an important aggregate measure 
of taxable resources.
To measure the infrastructural importance of each grid cell, we trace the road and 
railway network of the colony before 1907 and measure the presence of either infra-
structure type for each grid cell. Again, information on colonial roads and railway 
tracks comes from official maps of the colonial administration. We expect that police 
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Figure 1. Police Stations in 1907 and 1912.
Source: Authors’ elaboration; Rafalski, Vom Niemandsland zum Ordnungsstaat.
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presence is more likely in areas with a developed road and rail network, since police 
officers were tasked with securing these arteries of colonial trade.
Finally, after the war against the Herero and Nama, a major concern for the colonial 
government was to ensure the dominance and safety of the white settler population. 
Hence we expect that particular attention was paid to areas of prior resistance against 
the colonial power. We measure an area’s prior resistance by georeferencing the loca-
tion of skirmishes and battles between the colonial military and Africans before 1907. 
Accounts of individual incidents come from official records of the Schutztruppe.69 We 
were able to georeference the vast majority of individual incidents by town and village 
names mentioned in the reports. For each grid cell we simply calculate the total count 
of battles that occurred before 1907.
We add a number of important political and social controls to our grid cell data. 
First, in order to differentiate the expansion of the police from other forms of preexist-
ing state capacity, we measure the presence of military and missionary stations across 
the colony. Information on military stations comes from an official map of the German 
colonial office that details the location of all permanent posts of the Schutztruppe.70 
Missionary activity, organized by private religious organizations, was heavily sanc-
tioned and supported by the state. We identify the set of existing religious missions 
from Schlunk71 and georeference their location. Using the location of military and 
missionary stations we construct simple count variables for each grid cell. We also 
code a dummy variable as 1 for all grid cells that fall into the official “police zone.” 
This zone had its origins in a veterinary border created in 1897 after the outbreak of 
Rinderpest, which threatened the economically important cattle industry (and contrib-
uted to the economic marginalization of the Herero). At first a loose string of outposts 
meant to stop the spread of the disease from north to south, the veterinary border was 
gradually expanded and adjusted and became, in 1907, the so-called police zone. 
While it designated a core area of settlement for Germans, the police zone pushed 
Africans out. The colonial administration encouraged settlement and guaranteed the 
enforcement of property rights only within its borders. It thus acted as a powerful 
geographic magnet for the more general development of state capacity.72 We also cal-
culate the distance from each grid cell’s centroid to the capital city Windhuk and the 
closest international border to measure the remoteness of the region.
To measure the local disease environment, we rely on the German administration’s 
own assessment. The colonial government issued an official map that divided the ter-
ritory in regions deemed “healthy” for white settlers and “unhealthy,” which largely 
tracks the geographic incidence of malaria in modern Namibia.73 We use this demarca-
tion to classify grid cells as either healthy or unhealthy. Last, we calculate the number 
of indigenous ethnic groups within each grid cell based on a colonial map of the col-
ony.74 For additional robustness checks we extend our set of control variables to cover 
average temperature levels, precipitation, elevation, agricultural soil quality, and the 
topographical ruggedness of each grid cell. Using the map of ethnic settlement areas, 
we also construct a series of dummy variables for the presence of each major ethnic 
group (Western Bechuan, Sambesi, Ovambo, Nama, Herero, Gunun, Bushmen, 
Basters). Using Murdoch’s75 data on precolonial features of ethnic groups, we also 
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determine whether in a given grid cell African societies showed forms of political 
centralization.
Our first analysis estimates the effect of economic extraction potential, infrastruc-
ture, and prior resistance against colonial rule on the initial distribution of police sta-
tions in 1907. This allows us to unpack the underlying rationale for the spatial extent 
of the colonial police forces at their inception. We estimate simple cross-sectional 
models of the following form:
η α β γ µ θi i i iecon resist ra z= + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗inf
Where β estimates the effect of our economic potential variables, the effect of prior 
resistance, μ the effect of infrastructure, and θ is a vector of coefficients for control 
variables. We use a number of link functions for the linear predictor ηi, depending on 
the exact nature of our outcome measure. For our binary variable of station presence 
we employ a standard logit link as well as a normal linear model. For our police station 
and manpower count variable, we use negative binomial models (to account for over-
dispersion) and also standard linear models. Across all specifications we use robust 
standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity.
In a second step, we combine information from 1907 with the distribution of sta-
tions in 1912 and construct a two period panel dataset. We use information on time-
varying controls from before 1907 and 1911. We estimate models of the following 
form:
η α δ β γ µ θi i t it i ititecon resist ra z= + + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + ∗inf
We begin by estimating standard logit and OLS models with our binary measure of 
police presence that omit grid cell fixed effects αi and year fixed effects δt. We then 
estimate a linear panel model that includes both, in order to control for unobserved, 
time-invariant characteristics of the grid cells and temporal shocks to the station net-
work. We cluster standard errors at the grid cell level for all three models. We repeat 
this type of analysis for our station count measure, using negative binomial, OLS, and 
OLS with fixed effects models. We estimate the same set of specifications for the total 
manpower count for each grid cell. Last, we also construct a measure that captures the 
police station type in each grid cell. Since stations differed in their authority and 
administrative rank, we construct an ordinal measure ranging from zero (no station 
present), 1 (local station), 2 (district station), to 3 (regional station). We estimate a 
pooled ordinal logit, OLS, and OLS with fixed effects for this outcome variable.
Table 1 presents our main, cross-sectional results. Turning to our main variables of 
interest, we find broad support for Hypotheses 1–3. First, the number of prior battles 
between German troops and indigenous groups has a positive and statistically signifi-
cant effect in five of the six models. The effect is also substantively meaningful. Model 
2 implies that a grid cell with a one standard deviation higher level of battles has a four 
percentage points higher probability of receiving a police station in 1907. Given that 
the baseline probability of receiving a station was approximately 13 percent, this is a 
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Table 1. Police Station Presence, Cross-Section, 1907.
Police Station 
Presence Police Station Count Police Strength
 Logistic OLS
Negative 
Binomial OLS
Negative 
Binomial OLS
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Minerals 1.290** 0.156*** 0.250* 0.177*** 1.131*** 0.601
(0.529) (0.047) (0.141) (0.066) (0.223) (0.463)
Military Stations 0.550 0.073 0.600** 0.031 0.909*** −1.040**
(0.540) (0.087) (0.286) (0.085) (0.344) (0.453)
Missions 0.270 0.092 0.118 0.121 0.448 0.475
(0.469) (0.089) (0.206) (0.094) (0.387) (0.713)
Police Zone 0.251 −0.008 0.706 −0.024 0.622 −0.363*
(0.724) (0.031) (0.454) (0.034) (0.538) (0.194)
Railways 0.901 0.132 0.386 0.154 0.156 −0.398
(0.633) (0.101) (0.317) (0.120) (0.440) (0.612)
Roads 2.096*** 0.100** 1.788** 0.063 2.082*** 0.006
(0.664) (0.039) (0.767) (0.048) (0.619) (0.179)
Population 0.027*** 0.002** 0.001 0.002*** 0.012*** 0.047***
(0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.008)
Good Health Conditions −0.892 −0.038 −0.395 −0.039 −0.696 −0.015
(0.880) (0.029) (0.522) (0.031) (0.738) (0.268)
Number Ethnic Groups 0.175 0.016 0.209 0.031 0.227 0.149
(0.293) (0.020) (0.205) (0.027) (0.259) (0.217)
Battles 0.283** 0.030** 0.159*** 0.038** 0.282*** 0.319
(0.130) (0.013) (0.043) (0.015) (0.103) (0.224)
Border Distance 0.001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.005 0.005
(0.005) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.003)
Capital Distance −0.004* −0.0002 −0.002 −0.0003* −0.003* −0.001
(0.002) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.001)
Farms Pct 2.203* 0.288* 1.897*** 0.528** 0.896 −0.816
(1.253) (0.151) (0.730) (0.238) (0.997) (1.280)
Constant −3.484** 0.076 −3.854*** 0.090 −4.008*** −0.230
(1.654) (0.076) (1.037) (0.088) (1.396) (0.644)
N 398 398 398 398 398 398
R2 0.408 0.417 0.496
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.397 0.479
Log Likelihood −77.672 −119.969 −212.863  
Θ 3,538.882 0.344***  
 (32,832.330) (0.072)  
Akaike Inf. Crit. 183.343 267.938 453.726  
Residual Std. Error  
(df = 384)
0.266 0.325 2.694
F Statistic (df = 13; 384) 20.361*** 21.101*** 29.063***
Source: Authors’ data.
***Significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.
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30 percent increase in the relative probability. Our economic extraction variables—the 
presence of minerals, the percentage of farmland, and the size of the white popula-
tion—also show positive and statistically significant effects. Grid cells with a single 
mineral mine were nearly sixteen percentage points more likely to receive a police 
station in 1907. Grid cells with a one standard deviation higher level of farmland were 
four percentage points more likely to feature a police station, while cells with a one 
standard deviation higher level of white population were 10 percent more likely to 
have a station. The presence of infrastructure also seems to have an effect. While the 
coefficient on railroad presence fails to attain statistical significance, grid cells that 
featured road infrastructure before 1907 were more likely to receive a police station in 
1907 (by about ten percentage points). All findings suggest that the macro logic of 
state building heavily emphasized resource extraction, the protection of infrastructure, 
and the pacification of the indigenous population. The results also clearly show that 
the geographical allocation of police infrastructures and the distribution of police man-
power followed a very similar logic, being both influenced by a very similar set of 
economic, infrastructural, and political factors.
Our findings are robust to a number of alternative tests. We reestimate the models 
in Table 1 with additional controls for precipitation levels (and its square), average 
temperature, elevation, ruggedness, and soil quality (see Section 2 in the online 
Appendix76). We also include dummies for specific ethnic groups (Appendix, Section 
3) and Murdoch’s indicator of prior political centralization, without affecting our main 
findings (see Appendix, Section 4).
Table 2 extends our analysis to the panel data setup. The table reports results for our 
binary indicator of police station presence in 1907 and 1912. We will constrain our 
discussion to our main variables of interest. Our battle indicator is still estimated to be 
positive in the pooled specifications, but only attains 10 percent significance in Model 
2, in part because of the time invariant nature of this variable, which can essentially 
explain only cross-sectional differences in our panel. When we repeat the analysis 
using the number of stations, the number of police officers or the station type as depen-
dent variables, the statistical significance of the positive effect increases dramatically 
(see Sections 5–7 in the Appendix).
Our indicator for mineral mines also remains positive and statistically significant in 
Models 1 and 2 (with similar findings for the other outcome measures). Since there is no 
change in the number of mineral mines after 1907, this indicator is absorbed in the grid 
cell fixed effects in Model 3. For our panel data we can include a new indicator for eco-
nomic extraction that tracks the discovery of diamonds. Across all three models we find 
that diamonds are positively associated with the creation of a police stations, even in the 
panel model with grid cell and year fixed effects. Model 3 suggests that a single diamond 
field increased the probability of having a station in 1912 by nearly twenty-four percent-
age points. Our measure of white settler farmland is also positive across all three specifi-
cations, but only attains statistical significance in Model 2, similar to the coefficient for 
the overall size of the white population. This might be the case because both indicators 
only change slowly between 1907 and 1912. Last, our indicator that captures the road 
network remains positive and statistically significant across all three specifications.
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Table 2. Police Station Presence, Panel 1907 and 1912.
Police Station Presence
 Logistic OLS Panel Linear
 (1) (2) (3)
Minerals 0.460* 0.059*  
(0.241) (0.035)  
Military Stations 0.365 0.044 −0.023
(0.491) (0.070) (0.062)
Missions 0.666** 0.142** 0.079
(0.338) (0.070) (0.068)
Police Zone 0.633 0.028 −0.023
(0.423) (0.029) (0.058)
Railways 0.361 0.129* 0.148
(0.355) (0.066) (0.129)
Roads 1.877*** 0.146*** 0.107**
(0.405) (0.031) (0.046)
Population 0.012 0.001** 0.0005
(0.010) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Good Health 
Conditions
0.120 −0.008  
(0.472) (0.026)  
Number Ethnic 
Groups
0.337* 0.031*  
Battles 0.080 0.021*  
(0.081) (0.012)  
Border Distance 0.002 0.0001  
(0.002) (0.0002)  
Capital Distance 0.0001 −0.00004  
(0.001) (0.0001)  
Farms Pct 1.130 0.311*** 0.159
(1.105) (0.112) (0.139)
Diamonds 3.376*** 0.293** 0.237*
(0.865) (0.126) (0.124)
Telegraph −0.298 −0.023 0.053
(0.691) (0.120) (0.147)
Constant −5.054*** −0.037  
(0.849) (0.060)  
N 796 796 796
R2 0.345 0.071
Adjusted R2 0.332 0.035
Log Likelihood −227.357  
Akaike Inf. Crit. 486.713  
Residual Std. Error 0.311 (df = 780)  
F Statistic 27.392*** (df = 15; 780) 3.302*** (df = 9; 389)
Source: Authors’ data.
***Significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent level.
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In sum, results from our cross-sectional and panel data analysis lend strong support 
for our theoretical expectations expressed in Hypotheses 1–3. The overall geographic 
distribution of police stations and police personnel followed a clear, overarching logic: 
repressive state capacity was created in areas that experienced prior resistance to colo-
nial rule, where the potential for economic extraction was particularly strong, and 
where essential state infrastructure had to be protected.
The Distribution of Personnel
In our second analysis we explore how individual police officers were assigned across 
police stations within colonial Namibia. By doing so, we are able to identify the individ-
ual-level characteristics of officers that played a role in determining assignments to hard-
ship posts versus more desirable locations. This, in turn, allows us to assess in how far 
the allocation of human resources was affected by adverse selection problems. As 
described in the section “Constructing the State,” above, we argue that the colonial gov-
ernment faced a substantial principal-agent problem in the use of police officers to 
enforce the monopoly of violence. We argue that the substantial bargaining power of 
skilled, experienced, senior officers vis-à-vis their superiors, strengthened by the admin-
istration’s need to retain skilled officers for challenging monitoring tasks in the center of 
the colonial state, created higher likelihood that they would be assigned to desirable sta-
tions. By contrast, the lack of bargaining power of young, unqualified recruits (or the 
desire for rent seeking) led to their assignment to remote stations with low oversight.
To trace indirect evidence for these dynamics, we begin by constructing a person-
station-spell dataset. In effect, we take all individual records for each police officer 
and create as units of analysis separate station assignments, linked by a unique officer 
identifier. We focus exclusively on the Landespolizei’s German officers because the 
colonial authorities did not compile any personnel files of African police assistants. 
For each assignment spell we are able to identify the regional station of the posting 
from archival records (a finer-grained matching to district or local stations was not 
feasible because personnel were repeatedly reallocated within individual regions). For 
the purposes of our analysis, we distinguish between three major characteristics of 
assignment locations: economic importance, political importance, and general desir-
ability of the districts. The first two characteristics reflect two of the state’s macro 
goals, while conversely representing “hardship” assignments from the police officer’s 
perspective, which allows us to observe a misalignment between the state’s and indi-
vidual police officer’s preferences.77 The third characteristic reflects assignments that 
are generally desirable for officers but of no immediate strategic concern to the state. 
The distinction is exhaustive or nonoverlapping, since economically important dis-
tricts, for example, can simultaneously be politically important, and some desirable 
locations (e.g., having schools and hospitals) are also economically relevant. To mea-
sure each dimension we use a number of observable metrics and then simply dichoto-
mize to ease interpretation. In other words, each assignment location can fall under 
several (or none) of the three types: “economically important,” “politically impor-
tant,” and “nonhardship.”
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We consider an assignment to be in an economically important location if the 
administrative district either had mineral or diamond mine or was above the median 
value of the percentage of white farmland.78 Such assignments were important to the 
leadership of the colonial police force, who were charged with overseeing and regulat-
ing economic extraction in the colony. They were also often hardship assignments, 
because they either were in remote and desolate areas, as was often the case with 
minerals and diamonds, or because they required a lot of work for police officers, such 
as patrolling settlers’ plots.
For politically sensitive areas we assign a value of 1 if a district experienced a num-
ber of battles between German forces and locals before 1907 above median for the 
colony. Again, such assignments were politically important: officers were tasked with 
the delicate and crucial management of relations with local ethnic groups, who had 
strong grievances against both the colonial government and white population and who 
had demonstrated an ability to threaten colonial forces. Such stations were hardship 
positions also because of their remote location, outside the police zone, which meant 
increased personal risks for police officers.
Our third type captures assignments that were fairly desirable from the perspective of 
police officers and constitute nonhardship locations. These were less dangerous stations, 
often centrally located, which featured less demanding tasks than assignments in the 
other two categories. We code nonhardship assignments according to whether a station 
falls into regions without a health risk designation, whether the district falls within the 
boundaries of the official police zone, and whether there were any colonial hospitals and 
schools present. Prime examples of such assignments are stations in Windhuk or 
Swakopmund, which offered a substantially higher quality of life for police officers.
The independent variables of interest pertain to the individual characteristics of the 
officers. Using their personnel records, we code variables for: their ages at the begin-
ning of each assignment spell, whether they were Catholic or Protestant, whether they 
had completed some form of advanced schooling, whether they had learned a skilled 
trade (e.g., carpentry or metalsmithing), whether they had served in the Schutztruppe 
before switching to the civilian police force, whether they were ever promoted during 
their military service, whether they gained any experience during the campaigns 
against the Herero or Nama, and whether they earned any official merits for valor in 
combat during their military service. We also create dummy variables for: marital 
status, whether they had children, a count for their tenure as police officer at the begin-
ning of each assignment spell, and whether the police administration’s internal assess-
ment deemed them fit for service in the tropics. Superiors in the German colonial 
police were also required to grade each employee on their skills in operating fire arms, 
riding a horse, and leadership. We create a binary variable that records whether an 
individual always, across all categories and recorded assessments, scored in the top 
category. This is meant to capture the overall “quality” of individual officers as 
assessed by their superiors in the police force. Last, we count the number of prior reas-
signments for each individual at the beginning of each station spell.
We estimate standard logit models with our assignment types as dependent vari-
ables. We employ robust standard errors throughout our analysis. Table 3 reports our 
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results. Model 1 shows the estimated coefficients for assignment to an economically 
important district. We can see that the only statistically significant factors are whether 
the individual had children, their tenure length, and the “fit for tropics” indicator. This 
Table 3. Allocation of Personnel.
Economic Resistance Nonhardship
 (1) (2) (3)
Age 0.011 0.005 −0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Catholic 0.117 −0.097 −0.219
(0.150) (0.151) (0.153)
Adv School 0.028 −0.227 0.033
(0.199) (0.200) (0.194)
Schutztruppe −0.185 0.104 0.147
(0.199) (0.195) (0.198)
Promotion Army −0.151 0.492 0.021
(0.364) (0.392) (0.352)
Fight Exp 0.088 0.191 −0.529**
(0.222) (0.226) (0.223)
Merits −0.020 0.471* −0.106
(0.236) (0.245) (0.235)
Skilled Trade −0.146 −0.206* 0.050
(0.123) (0.124) (0.124)
Married 0.087 0.141 0.179
(0.170) (0.169) (0.168)
Children −0.478** −0.390** −0.252
(0.197) (0.198) (0.199)
Tenure Length −0.170*** −0.109*** −0.104***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Fit Tropics 0.292* 0.367** 0.004
(0.149) (0.147) (0.150)
Quality −0.029 −0.447*** 0.312**
(0.158) (0.161) (0.156)
Reassignments 0.019 −0.199*** 0.225***
(0.063) (0.068) (0.065)
Constant 0.778* −0.968** 0.093
(0.397) (0.433) (0.389)
N 1,200 1,200 1,200
Log Likelihood −779.024 −781.987 −785.418
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,588.048 1,593.974 1,600.836
Source: Authors’ data.
***Significant at the 1 percent level; **significant at the 5 percent level; *significant at the 10 percent 
level.
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suggests that especially young and fresh recruits, without family and extensive experi-
ence were assigned to remote mining areas and locations with increased patrol respon-
sibilities. In contrast, individuals with a longer service record and with families were 
able to avoid postings to economically important areas.
Model 2 details our findings for dangerous but politically important locations. Here 
we find that combat merits, skilled trade, children, tenure length, fitness for tropics, 
quality assessment, and number of prior reassignments are statistically significant pre-
dictors. The implications of the patterns are interesting. They clearly show that the 
colonial administration had to balance a desire to assign capable agents to sensitive 
areas with the desire of skilled officers to avoid frontline assignments. Having docu-
mented combat skills via earned merits increases the probability of assignment. The 
negative effect of tenure length and prior reassignments suggests that largely young, 
inexperienced individuals were pushed toward service in the most dangerous places. 
Individuals with increased bargaining power, that is, with children, knowledge of a 
skilled trade, and longer tenure times and multiple rotations under their belt, were 
more likely to avoid postings in politically important areas. One of the most interesting 
findings pertains to the role of the internal quality assessment: we find that high qual-
ity assessments are negatively correlated with dangerous assignments. This suggests 
that the most capable officers were able to parlay their skill into better assignments 
closer to the administrative centers of the capital. In contrast, young, low-quality 
recruits with a penchant for violence were most likely to be assigned to remote and 
dangerous locations.
These findings are further confirmed in Model 3. Assignments to nonhardship loca-
tions were driven by prior fighting experience, tenure length, a positive quality assess-
ment of the individual, and prior reassignments. Both the coefficient for reassignments 
and quality of the officer suggest that established, high-quality individuals had a higher 
likelihood of being assigned to nonhardship districts. On the other hand, officers with 
prior fighting experience are less likely to receive nonhardship assignments. It is inter-
esting that although the count of prior reassignments has an overall negative effect, 
tenure length also shows a negative and significant coefficient. This result speaks 
against the notion that more experienced officers always received more desirable 
assignments. The reason might very well be because new recruits were often assigned 
to police depots for initial training, whereas seasoned officers had to serve some stints 
in less desirable locations.
We extend our analysis further by restricting our sample to initial assignment spells 
of new recruits, focusing on individuals with at least one and not more than two years 
of service. Identifying initial assignment decisions allows us to assess whether high-
quality recruits received better assignments from the start, and not only after a suffi-
cient service record had been established. We again find evidence that prior experience 
with violence is correlated with an assignment in an economically or politically impor-
tant location, while high-quality recruits—by their superiors’ assessments—received 
nonhardship assignments.
Overall, these patterns are in line with Hypothesis 4 and offer evidence for the 
existence of a trade-off between the macro-strategic goals of the colonial 
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administration and its ability to overcome micro-level challenges of personnel 
management. Given the severity of the principal-agent problem in remote and chal-
lenging locations, the administration should prefer to assign seasoned veterans, 
with high levels of discipline, instead of inexperienced recruits. It was clearly not 
feasible to do so, because recruits with the highest assessments leveraged their 
informal bargaining power to receive better assignments, or because rent-seeking 
recruits self-selected into remote assignments, or because the colonial administra-
tion needed high-quality recruits at the central level to fulfill monitoring functions. 
As a consequence, the administration assigned individuals with lower assessments 
by superior officers, but with documented military or combat experience, to strate-
gically important locations.
This outcome of principle-agent problems and resource scarcity had important 
consequences. Although the larger strategic goal of securing economic extraction 
and ensuring the pacification of local ethnic groups was supported in terms of infra-
structure and overall manpower, internal personnel management struggled to supply 
the appropriate police officers. In the personnel files we investigated, policemen’s 
superiors recorded officers’ numerous disciplinary infractions, which ranged from 
disobedience, drunkenness, and physical abuse to sexual assault on the local popula-
tion. These transgressions fundamentally undermined the overall goals of the colo-
nial administration: they reduced the actual effectiveness of police, negatively 
affected the perception of its legitimacy, and led to an oversupply of state violence 
at the local level.
Conclusion
How do states build security institutions to enforce their monopoly on violence? We 
investigate this question in the context of colonial Namibia. We argue that macro-
strategic goals of extraction, pacification, and the protection of crucial state infrastruc-
ture determine the allocation of scarce repressive resources across the colony’s 
territory. Analyzing historical data from German archives, we provide statistical evi-
dence to that effect. We find that the expansion of the colonial police force was heavily 
influenced by the location of valuable mineral deposits, prior resistance against the 
colonial state, and the presence of road and railroad infrastructure.
We provide evidence for the rationale underlying the construction of the police 
force. We also uncover evidence for the pathologies and trade-offs that appear in the 
management of personnel tasked with the enforcement of the monopoly of violence. 
The imperative to project state power across the colony’s territory generates adverse-
selection problems in the recruitment and assignment of staff and increases monitoring 
costs. Given the scarcity of human capital and the high bargaining power of skilled 
police officers, station heads had to make difficult choices about the deployment of 
their staff. We provide evidence from personnel records that station heads were forced 
to assign low-quality and inexperienced recruits to the most strategically important 
locations in the colony, likely undermining the macro-strategic goals that were driving 
the expansion of the colonial police.
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Our article adds useful insights to the literatures on state building and colonialism. 
Existing work on state building has emphasized the roles of structural conditions and 
violent conflict for building effective states. Most prior research has relied on the 
assumption that patterns of state penetration can be inferred from those conditions and 
from the state-builder’s rational strategies. We add to that research in two ways. First, 
we provide support for the importance of extractive potential and instances of violence 
in shaping macro strategies of state building and the allocation of resources in terms of 
infrastructure and manpower. Second, we also identify the presence of a trade-off 
between macro-strategic goals and the allocation of a key state resource: human capi-
tal. Internal administrative challenges undermine the effective implementation of the 
macro strategy of allocating the most qualified agents to priority areas. This finding 
underscores the need to consider the administrative challenges of the state-building 
process more fully rather than to focus on preexisting structural conditions and ratio-
nal strategies of resource allocation alone.
Finally, the case of German Southwest Africa provides a detailed quantitative anal-
ysis of state-building efforts to the literature on colonialism. Previous work has high-
lighted the massive resource constraints of colonial state-building projects.79 Whereas 
these studies emphasize how resource scarcity constrained the geographical extent of 
colonial state penetration, our own research demonstrates how the lack of resources 
also shaped the processes of resource allocation within colonial administrations. 
Scarcity of resources not only prevented the establishment of a meaningful presence 
across the colony but also fostered adverse allocation of resources within the limited 
territorial reach of the state. Our analysis also speaks to debates around the specific 
characteristics of settler colonies. Others have pointed out that settler colonies often 
featured a particularly violent relationship between the white minority population and 
natives.80 Our work serves as a detailed quantitative case study of how a colonial gov-
ernment constructed a police apparatus to manage this relationship. Existing scholar-
ship on settler colonies has also identified another form of principal-agent problem: 
the divergence of interests between local settlers and the colonial home government. 
Although not as flagrant in German Southwest Africa, cases such as the pieds noirs in 
Algeria, or of white settlers in the Rhodesias, illustrate the emergence of stark differ-
ences in political priorities that complicate the role of colonial government. Hence, 
colonial administrations with a large footprint—common in settler colonies or under 
direct rule—possibly invite two distinct types of principal-agent problems: (1) a cleav-
age between principals in the metropole and local colonists and (2) agency problems 
internal to the administration of the settler colony. Although extractive colonies with 
small administrative presence (e.g., because of a reliance on forms of indirect rule) 
might be better placed to avoid either problem, they in turn have to manage principal-
agent problems external to the organization of the colonial government, such as the 
management of relationships with local headmen and chiefs. Future research will have 
to investigate further the trade-offs between these different governance strategies.
Other studies will also have to unpack our findings on the tension between macro 
goals and problems of personnel management. Specifically, we do not have enough 
quantitative data or qualitative evidence to distinguish effectively between the different 
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potential micro-level mechanisms driving the misallocation of personnel across sta-
tions, nor can we trace the importance of hitherto unobserved factors, such as personal 
networks, in the assignment of police officers. Individuals with a long duration of ten-
ure as well as biographical ties to superiors may be better able to ensure assignment to 
low-hardship positions.81 We are also unable fully to investigate the unintended conse-
quences of the trade-off between the spatial expansion of police stations and the inabil-
ity to assign high-quality recruits to strategically important locations. Although 
anecdotal evidence suggests that this practice engendered a host of disciplinary prob-
lems and violence against the civilian population, further study is necessary.
The results of our study are in some ways specific to German Southwest Africa 
because of the close convergence of settler and metropolitan interests around the 
maintenance of white minority rule. Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis may 
contribute to other, comparable contexts. Specifically, we contend that the trade-off 
between macro-strategic goals of state building and principal-agent problems in per-
sonnel management is pervasive in four scenarios: other white-minority settler colo-
nies, nascent or fragile states that claim large territories (e.g., postcolonial African 
states),82 state-building efforts under occupation (e.g., the United States in Iraq and 
Afghanistan), and instances of internal colonization (the US western frontier or 
Australia’s interior).
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